{
 "public_id": "AIR-2024-0041",
 "incident_id": "2024-09-openai-chatgpt-spaiware",
 "date_disclosed": "2024-09-20",
 "date_occurred": null,
 "title": "SpAIware: spyware injected into ChatGPT long-term memory for persistent exfiltration",
 "class": "responsible_disclosure",
 "attack_surface": "consumer_chatbot",
 "initial_vector": "indirect_prompt_injection_document_web",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "memory_write",
  "url_rendering"
 ],
 "target_product": "ChatGPT macOS app",
 "target_vendor": "OpenAI",
 "autonomy_level": "assistant",
 "impact_realized": false,
 "impact_type": [
  "persistent_memory_poisoning",
  "data_exfiltration"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "ChatGPT macOS users with memory enabled",
 "cve": [],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI01",
   "ASI06",
   "ASI02"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [],
  "labels": [
   "spaiware",
   "memory_poisoning",
   "persistence",
   "url_safe_bypass"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "client-side URL validation (url_safe), bypassed",
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "fixed in ChatGPT version 1.2024.247 (September 2024); the underlying memory-injection issue remained",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2024/chatgpt-macos-app-persistent-data-exfiltration/"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "Since the malicious instructions are stored in ChatGPT's memory, all new conversation going forward will contain the attackers instructions.",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "Johann Rehberger. The canonical demonstration that agent memory turns a one-shot injection into persistence.",
 "risk_category": "privacy",
 "risk_secondary": [],
 "risk_subcategory": "Data Exfiltration via Context",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "agent_acted",
 "agency_debatable": false,
 "agency_reason": "the assistant wrote spyware to memory and exfiltrated on later turns",
 "vector_family": "indirect_prompt_injection",
 "vector_detail": "indirect_prompt_injection_document_web",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "unknown"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "silent",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [],
  "cve": [],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI01",
 "agent_framework": "unknown",
 "model_provider": "openai",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "external_researcher",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "data_exfiltration_channels",
 "eai_domain": "privacy",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "data_and_memory_poisoning",
  "confused_deputy"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "subcategory: Data Exfiltration via Context",
 "asi_curated": [
  "ASI01"
 ],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "curated_plus_rule",
 "asi_reason": "curated: ASI01 | added ASI06 (signal=memory), ASI02 (impact=tool_misuse)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}