{
 "public_id": "AIR-2024-0035",
 "incident_id": "2024-08-slack-ai-private-channel-exfiltration",
 "date_disclosed": "2024-08-20",
 "date_occurred": null,
 "title": "Data exfiltration from Slack AI private channels via indirect prompt injection in a public channel",
 "class": "responsible_disclosure",
 "attack_surface": "enterprise_assistant",
 "initial_vector": "indirect_prompt_injection_message",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "retrieval",
  "link_rendering",
  "cross_channel_retrieval",
  "file_ingestion"
 ],
 "target_product": "Slack AI",
 "target_vendor": "Slack (Salesforce)",
 "autonomy_level": "assistant",
 "impact_realized": false,
 "impact_type": [
  "data_exfiltration",
  "credential_theft",
  "phishing"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "any Slack workspace with Slack AI enabled",
 "cve": [],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI01",
   "ASI06",
   "ASI03"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [
   "AML.CS0035"
  ],
  "labels": [
   "rag_poisoning",
   "cross_tenant_boundary",
   "private_channel_leak",
   "indirect_prompt_injection",
   "scope_violation",
   "markdown_link_exfil"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "none specific to prompt injection",
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "Slack pushed a patch for the private-channel case but classified public-channel searchability as intended behavior",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://promptarmor.substack.com/p/data-exfiltration-from-slack-ai-via",
  "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-atlas/atlas-data/main/dist/v6/ATLAS-2026.07.yaml",
  "https://promptarmor.substack.com/p/slack-ai-data-exfiltration-from-private"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "This vulnerability can allow attackers to steal anything a user puts in a private Slack channel by manipulating the language model used for content generation.",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "PromptArmor. Attacker needs only a non-admin account and a public channel post; victim need not be in that channel. | Merged from duplicate id `2024-08-slack-ai-channel-exfil`. Also reported as: 'Slack AI data exfiltration from private channels via indirect prompt injection'.",
 "risk_category": "security_fraud",
 "risk_secondary": [
  "privacy"
 ],
 "risk_subcategory": "Prompt Injection",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [
  "Credential & Secret Theft"
 ],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "agent_acted",
 "agency_debatable": false,
 "agency_reason": "Slack AI retrieved the private channel and rendered the exfiltration link",
 "vector_family": "indirect_prompt_injection",
 "vector_detail": "indirect_prompt_injection_message",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "none"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "not_applicable",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [
   "AML.CS0035"
  ],
  "cve": [],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI01",
 "agent_framework": "unknown",
 "model_provider": "unknown",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "external_researcher",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "data_and_memory_poisoning",
 "eai_domain": "reliability_and_observability",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "credential_theft",
  "data_exfiltration_channels",
  "human_manipulation",
  "confused_deputy"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "impact rule: data_and_memory_poisoning",
 "asi_curated": [
  "ASI01"
 ],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "curated_plus_rule",
 "asi_reason": "curated: ASI01 | added ASI06 (eai_category=data_and_memory_poisoning), ASI03 (signal=identity)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}