{
 "public_id": "AIR-2024-0004",
 "incident_id": "2024-05-openai-chatgpt-memory-injection",
 "date_disclosed": "2024-02-01",
 "date_occurred": null,
 "title": "Persistent memory poisoning of ChatGPT via prompt injection in a shared Google Doc",
 "class": "responsible_disclosure",
 "attack_surface": "memory_store",
 "initial_vector": "indirect_prompt_injection_document",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "memory_write",
  "connected_app_retrieval",
  "memory_delete",
  "image_analysis"
 ],
 "target_product": "OpenAI ChatGPT (memory / Connected Apps)",
 "target_vendor": "OpenAI",
 "autonomy_level": "assistant",
 "impact_realized": false,
 "impact_type": [
  "persistence",
  "integrity_violation",
  "misinformation",
  "persistent_memory_poisoning"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "any ChatGPT user who references an attacker-supplied shared document",
 "cve": [],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI01",
   "ASI06"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [
   "AML.CS0040"
  ],
  "labels": [
   "memory_poisoning",
   "persistence",
   "cross_session",
   "integrity_violation"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "'Memory updated' UI indicator",
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "not fixed - OpenAI classified it as a Model Safety Issue rather than a reportable security flaw",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2024/chatgpt-hacking-memories/",
  "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-atlas/atlas-data/main/dist/v6/ATLAS-2026.07.yaml"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "Such a vulnerability would allow an attacker to write misinformation, bias and even instructions into your ChatGPT’s memories, and also create a form of persistence at the same time!",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "Johann Rehberger. Memory write happened with no human confirmation step beyond a passive UI banner. | Merged from duplicate id `2024-02-openai-chatgpt-memory-poisoning`. Also reported as: 'ChatGPT: hacking memories with prompt injection'.",
 "risk_category": "security_fraud",
 "risk_secondary": [
  "brand_trust"
 ],
 "risk_subcategory": "Prompt Injection",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [
  "Persistence & Covert C2"
 ],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "agent_acted",
 "agency_debatable": false,
 "agency_reason": "the assistant wrote the poisoned memory with no confirmation",
 "vector_family": "indirect_prompt_injection",
 "vector_detail": "indirect_prompt_injection_document",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "unknown"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "silent",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [
   "AML.CS0040"
  ],
  "cve": [],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI01",
 "agent_framework": "unknown",
 "model_provider": "multiple",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "external_researcher",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "data_and_memory_poisoning",
 "eai_domain": "reliability_and_observability",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "privilege_escalation",
  "human_manipulation",
  "confused_deputy"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "impact rule: data_and_memory_poisoning",
 "asi_curated": [
  "ASI01"
 ],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "curated_plus_rule",
 "asi_reason": "curated: ASI01 | added ASI06 (eai_category=data_and_memory_poisoning)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}