{
 "public_id": "AIR-2024-0003",
 "incident_id": "2024-02-google-gemini-delayed-tool-invocation",
 "date_disclosed": "2024-02-01",
 "date_occurred": null,
 "title": "Planting instructions for delayed automatic tool invocation in Google Gemini Workspace Extension",
 "class": "responsible_disclosure",
 "attack_surface": "enterprise_assistant",
 "initial_vector": "indirect_prompt_injection_email",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "extension_invocation",
  "context_persistence",
  "retrieval",
  "workspace_extension",
  "delayed_tool_invocation",
  "drive_access"
 ],
 "target_product": "Google Gemini (Workspace Extension)",
 "target_vendor": "Google",
 "autonomy_level": "assistant",
 "impact_realized": false,
 "impact_type": [
  "data_exfiltration",
  "unauthorized_tool_invocation",
  "unauthorized_data_access"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "Gemini users with Workspace Extensions enabled",
 "cve": [],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI01",
   "ASI03"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [
   "AML.CS0038"
  ],
  "labels": [
   "delayed_tool_invocation",
   "context_pollution",
   "confused_deputy",
   "control_bypass",
   "same_turn_mitigation_bypass"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "Gemini same-turn tool-invocation restriction after untrusted data enters context",
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "not fixed at publication; reported to Google November 2023 and confirmed as tracked",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2024/llm-context-pollution-and-delayed-automated-tool-invocation/",
  "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-atlas/atlas-data/main/dist/v6/ATLAS-2026.07.yaml"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "What if the adversary “pollutes” the chat context during the prompt injection attack and plants instructions that will trigger the invocation of the Workspace Extension at a later stage?",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "Johann Rehberger. Demonstrates that turn-scoped tool-invocation guards are bypassable by deferring the action to a later turn. Also reported as: 'Google Gemini: planting instructions for delayed automatic tool invocation'.",
 "risk_category": "privacy",
 "risk_secondary": [],
 "risk_subcategory": "Data Exfiltration via Context",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "agent_acted",
 "agency_debatable": false,
 "agency_reason": "Gemini invoked the Workspace extension on a later turn and exfiltrated",
 "vector_family": "indirect_prompt_injection",
 "vector_detail": "indirect_prompt_injection_email",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "permission_scope"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "silent",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [
   "AML.CS0038"
  ],
  "cve": [],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI01",
 "agent_framework": "google_gemini_workspace",
 "model_provider": "google",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "external_researcher",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "data_exfiltration_channels",
 "eai_domain": "privacy",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "confused_deputy"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "subcategory: Data Exfiltration via Context",
 "asi_curated": [
  "ASI01"
 ],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "curated_plus_rule",
 "asi_reason": "curated: ASI01 | added ASI03 (signal=identity)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}