{
 "public_id": "AIR-2023-0010",
 "incident_id": "2023-05-greshake-inject-my-pdf",
 "date_disclosed": "2023-05-15",
 "date_occurred": null,
 "title": "Inject My PDF: a public tool for embedding invisible prompt injections in resumes to manipulate AI screening systems",
 "class": "research_demo",
 "attack_surface": "enterprise_assistant",
 "initial_vector": "indirect_prompt_injection_document_invisible_text",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "document_parsing",
  "automated_screening_and_summarization"
 ],
 "target_product": "LLM-based resume screening and document analysis pipelines (GPT-4 era)",
 "target_vendor": "multiple",
 "autonomy_level": "assistant",
 "impact_realized": false,
 "impact_type": [
  "integrity_violation",
  "decision_manipulation"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "any organization running LLM-assisted document/resume screening",
 "cve": [],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI01"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [],
  "labels": [
   "invisible_text",
   "document_injection",
   "hiring_pipeline",
   "weaponized_tooling",
   "repeated_payload"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "none",
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "n/a",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://kai-greshake.de/posts/inject-my-pdf/"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "The text is rendered with minimum font size and opacity, so it is invisible to the human eye. However, it is still visible to AI text recognition algorithms.",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "Kai Greshake (co-author of the original indirect prompt injection paper). Notable as one of the first publicly released, ready-to-use injection tools aimed at a real automated decision pipeline rather than a lab demo; the payload is repeated five times with overlap on page one to raise success rate. Foreshadows the ICML 2025 hidden-reviewer-prompt scandal and later agentic document-triage attacks. Scope note: borderline for this corpus - the target is an automated screening pipeline rather than a tool-calling agent, retained because it is the canonical origin of the invisible-document-injection technique that later agent incidents reuse.",
 "risk_category": "product_misuse",
 "risk_secondary": [
  "safety_harm"
 ],
 "risk_subcategory": "Capability Abuse",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "agent_acted",
 "agency_debatable": true,
 "agency_reason": "the AI screening pipeline reads the injected resume and acts on it",
 "vector_family": "indirect_prompt_injection",
 "vector_detail": "indirect_prompt_injection_document_invisible_text",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "none"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "not_applicable",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [],
  "cve": [],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI01",
 "agent_framework": "unknown",
 "model_provider": "openai",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "external_researcher",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "policy_drift",
 "eai_domain": "governance",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "confused_deputy"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "subcategory: Capability Abuse",
 "asi_curated": [
  "ASI01"
 ],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "curated",
 "asi_reason": "curated: ASI01",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}